Public-private Partnerships in Micro-finance: Should NGO Involvement be Restricted? by Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Roy, Jaideep
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Public-private Partnerships in
Micro-finance: Should NGO Involvement
be Restricted?
Prabal Roy Chowdhury and Jaideep Roy
Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Center and Lancaster University.
14. August 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4469/
MPRA Paper No. 4469, posted 14. August 2007
Public-private Partnerships in Micro-finance:
Should NGO Involvement be Restricted?
Jaideep Roy∗
Prabal Roy Chowdhury†
August 14, 2007
Abstract
This paper examines public-private partnerships in micro-finance,
whereby NGOs can help in channelizing credit to the poor, both in
borrower selection, as well as in project implementation. We argue
that a distortion may arise out of the fact that the private partner, i.e.
the NGO, is a motivated agent. We find that whenever the project is
neither too productive, nor too unproductive, reducing such distortion
requires unbundling borrower selection and project implementation,
with the NGO being involved in borrower selection only.
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1 Introduction
Micro-finance is an important tool in fighting poverty.1 Scaling up micro-
finance operations, one of the central challenges facing the micro-finance
movement, is, however, often constrained by a lack of funds, particularly
when banks and recipients are not well connected. One possible solution is
to use public-private partnerships2 in micro-finance, whereby private agents,
namely non-governmental organizations (henceforth NGOs), link government
banks to micro-finance recipients.3 Interestingly, under the self-help group
(SHG) linkage program in India, the NGOs play precisely this role.4
The United Nations Interagency Committee on Integrated Rural Devel-
opment for Asia and the Pacific (1992) (henceforth UNICIRDAP) provides a
formal characterization of NGOs as organizations with six key features: they
are voluntary, non-profit, service and development oriented, autonomous,
highly motivated and committed, and operate under some form of formal reg-
istration [see also Besley and Ghatak (1999) for an extensive list of features
1A relatively recent and comprehensive survey of the literature is provided, among
others, by Aghion and Morduch (2005).
2We refer the readers to Maskin and Tirole (2007) for a succinct introduction to the
literature on public-private partnerships.
3Bennet and Iossa (2005) study institutional optimality in terms of private-public own-
ership structure for building and managing facilities that provide collective services, with a
focus on recent government policies in Western Europe and North America. See also Hart
(2002) on boundaries between private and public firms in advanced capitalist economies.
4In fact, the SHG linkage program is rapidly turning into the dominant micro-finance
paradigm in India (Basu and Srivastava, 2005). The number of self help groups linked to
banks has increased from 500 in the early 1990s, to over 8,00,000 by 2004. The program of
course has many other interesting aspects, e.g. group-lending and an emphasis on savings
(see, e.g. Aniket (2007) and Roy Chowdhury (2007)). For the sake of focus we abstract
from these aspects in this paper.
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and functions of NGOs operating across the globe].
In our framework, the NGO can potentially provide two services. First,
it can identify good, i.e. relatively more efficient, borrowers. Second, it can
help borrowers implement their projects more efficiently. These arise because
of the closeness of NGOs to their clientele, something which the government,
or profit-seeking organizations lack.5 In fact, Cernea (1988) reports a World
Bank survey that indicates a high correlation between NGO involvement and
success of Bank-financed projects. Thus, in contrast to some of the public-
private literature, it is ex post efficient to involve the NGO in both these
aspects.
The essential trade-off in the model arises because the NGO is a moti-
vated agent6 who maximizes the aggregate utility of the villagers. This is a
central theme in the literature on NGOs. UNICARDAP (1992), for example,
says that “the rural poor are given higher priority by NGOs” (page 20) as
compared to governments.
Given their motivations, from the view-point of the NGOs the more ef-
ficient borrowers are ‘less needy’ (in a sense made formal later on), so that
maximizing aggregate borrower utility may involve channelizing the loan to
the less efficient borrowers. Doing so becomes more attractive if the NGO is
also involved in the project implementation stage, since in that case the NGO
can help out the less efficient borrowers with their projects, thus reducing
the inefficiency arising out of the loan going to the less efficient borrowers.
With full NGO involvement, resolving this problem requires the rate of inter-
5In the Indian SHG-linkage program, for example, the idea is to utilize NGOs who are
already active in the area.
6Besley and Ghatak (2005) define motivated agents as those “who pursue goals because
they perceive intrinsic benefits from doing so” and give examples of such agents as doctors,
researchers, judges and soldiers.
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est to be so low, as to make lending infeasible for the banks. We show that
this happens whenever the project is neither too efficient, nor too inefficient.
Under these parameter conditions, implementing the first best therefore calls
for restricting NGO involvement to borrower selection alone.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide a
formal description of the environment. In Section 3 we establish and discuss
our main result. The paper concludes in Section 4.
2 The Economic Environment
A village consists of two individuals (henceforth villagers) who are about
to start a project each. Each project requires a start-up capital of 1 unit.
The villagers have no money or assets, and hence require to borrow this
amount from a bank which has limited resources and can finance only one
such project. We assume that the opportunity cost of capital is 0 and denote
r ≥ 1 as the interest factor. Further, there is limited liability.
Let θ ∈ {h, l} denote the skill level of a villager, with one of the villagers
being high-skilled (h type), and the other one being low-skilled (l type). This
difference in skill is manifested in two ways. First, a high skilled villager has
a better outside option in so far as his reservation utility is u > 0, while that
of the low skilled villager is 0. Second, the project can be risky, yielding
X (> 1) if it succeeds, and 0 if it fails. We assume that an h type villager
is always successful, while an l type villager has a success rate that is less
than 100 percent. The probability of success for a low skilled villager is λ′
if the NGO is involved in project implementation, and λ otherwise, where
1 > λ′ > λ > 0. Thus the success probability of the l type is higher if there
is NGO involvement. Moreover, output is observable.
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As discussed earlier, the lending environment includes a non-profit and
motivated NGO, who may be involved in two stages, 0 and 1. Stage 0 requires
the NGO to choose the villager to whom the loan is given out. This allows
the greater knowledge of the NGOs regarding borrower types to come into
play. In stage 1, the NGO may be directly involved in implementing the
project along with the selected villager. If the loan is sanctioned to a villager
and she repays r back to the bank, the NGO receives a fraction rβ0 if not
involved in stage 1, and rβ1 if involved in stage 1.
7
At the helm of this environment sits the government who sets up the in-
stitution denoted by the triple (I, r, βI), where I = 0 (respectively 1) implies
that the NGO is not involved (respectively involved) in stage 1.
We assume that all agents are risk-neutral expected utility maximizers.
Given this, the payoffs of the various agents are as follows. In the absence
of stage 1 involvement by the NGO, the villager who receives the loan has a
payoff equal to (X − r) if she is high skilled, and λ(X−r) otherwise. Whereas
if there is stage 1 involvement by the NGO, then these payoffs are (X − r)
and λ′ (X − r) respectively. A villager who does not obtain the loan earns
her reservation utility. We assume that X − 1 > u, otherwise the problem is
not interesting.
The NGO only cares about the aggregate utility of the borrowers. Thus
the utility of a NGO who selects a villager of skill h is X − r irrespective of
whether there is stage 1 involvement or not. While if the selected villager is
low skilled, then the NGO’s utility is λ′ (X − r)+u with stage 1 involvement,
and λ (X − r) + u otherwise.
7This income is used by the NGO to run its day-to-day activities. Allowing for this
payment to the NGOs, however, does not affect the analysis in any way. All our results
go through even if β0 = β1 = 0.
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We then consider the payoff of the bank. Under an institution I, it
receives (1− βI) r−1 if the selected villager is high skilled and λ (1− βI) r−1
if the selected borrower is low skilled.
3 Institutional Structure and Implementing
the First Best
We first study the behavior of the NGO. The following notations are helpful:
piθv is the payoff of the villager of skill θ; piN is the payoff of the NGO; finally,
piB is the payoff of the bank.
Institution with stage 1 involvement: Consider the institution (1, r, β1).
The NGO will select a high-skilled borrower if and only if X − r > λ′(X −
r) + u, that is
r < r˜ ≡ X − u
1− λ′ .
We thus have
Observation 1. Suppose there is stage 1 involvement and the NGO
selects a borrower in order to maximize its own utility. Then:
1. For r > r˜, pilv(1, r, β1) = λ
′(X − r), pihv (1, r, β1) = u, piN(1, r, β1) =
λ′(X − r) + u and piB(1, r, β1) = λ′(1− β1)r − 1..
2. For r ≤ r˜, pilv(1, r, β1) = 0, pihv (1, r, β1) = (X − r), piN(1, r, β1) = X − r
and piB(1, r, β1) = (1− β1)r − 1.
Next we examine the
Institution without stage 1 involvement: The NGO will select a bor-
rower of skill θ = h if and only if X − r > λ(X − r) + u, that is
r < rˆ = X − u
1− λ.
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Hence, the payoffs to the involved parties are given by
Observation 2. Suppose there is no stage 1 involvement and the NGO
selects a borrower in order to maximize its own utility. Then:
1. For r > rˆ, pilv(0, r, β0) = λ(X − r), pihv (0, r, β0) = u, piN(0, r, β0) =
λ(X − r) + u and piB(0, r, β0) = λ(1− β0)r − 1.
2. For r ≤ rˆ, pilv(0, r, β0) = 0, pihv (0, r, β0) = X − r, piN(0, r, β0) = X − r
and piB(0, r, β0) = (1− β0)r − 1.
The government maximizes welfare subject to a non-negative profit con-
straint for the bank, where social welfare equals the sum of the aggregate
utility of the villagers, the payoff of the bank and the monetary income of
the NGO. Thus while the government cares about the monetary income of
the NGO, it does not care about the utility externality enjoyed by the NGO.8
Suppose that a high skilled villager is selected. Then, the selected villager
earns X − r, the other villager earns 0, the bank earns (1− βI) r − 1, and
the NGO earns rβI . The social welfare is then
(X − r) + 0 + (1− βI) r − 1 + rβI = X − 1. (1)
Similarly, if a low skilled villager is selected then she earns p (X − r), where
p is the probability of success and equals λ or λ′ (depending upon whether
there is stage 1 involvement or not), the other villager earns u, the bank
earns p (1− βI) r − 1, and the NGO earns pβIr. Hence the social welfare in
this case is
p (X − r) + u+ p (1− βI) r − 1 + pβIr = pX + u− 1. (2)
8Our analysis, not reported here, suggest that very similar results go through even if the
government did take this into account. While the results will be qualified, the distortion
arising from the objectives of the government and the NGO being non-aligned will still
exists.
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In order to focus on the case of interest, we assume that the productivity
of the project is neither too large, nor too small.
Assumption 1. max
{
u
1−λ′ , 1 +
u
1−λ
}
< X < 1 + u
1−λ′ .
Notice immediately that since λ′ > λ, Assumption 1 is not vacuous. We
begin by solving for the first best outcome under this assumption. Since
X > u
1−λ′ , it follows that X − 1 > λ′X + u− 1 > λX + u− 1. Hence by (1)
and (2) we know that the social welfare is maximized when the high skilled
villager gets the loan, irrespective of whether there is stage 1 involvement or
not.
We then consider implementing this outcome. First consider an insti-
tution with stage 1 involvement. The NGO selects θ = h if and only if
r ≤ r˜ ≡ X − u
1−λ′ . Also, the government must ensure that it is feasible
for the bank to sanction the loan. This would require (1− β1) r ≥ 1, that is
r ≥ 1
1−β1 ≥ 1. Hence, to implement the first best it is necessary and sufficient
that
1
1− β1 ≤ r ≤ X −
u
1− λ′ . (3)
Notice, however, that Assumption 1 implies that X− u
1−λ′ < 1, so that r < 1
which violates the bank’s feasibility condition.
Now consider an institution without stage 1 involvement. An analogous
argument establishes that implementing the first best now requires
1
1− β0 ≤ r ≤ X −
u
1− λ. (4)
Given Assumption 1, X − u
1−λ > 1. Consequently, there exist r and β0 such
that (4) is true.
Finally, given that the bank and the government does not know the iden-
tity of the borrowers, not involving the NGO in stage 0 cannot be optimal,
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since in that case the loan will go to the low skilled villager with a positive
probability.
Summarizing the above discussion we obtain our main result.
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds.
(i) The first best involves sanctioning a loan to the high-skilled borrower.
(ii) The first best can be implemented only through an institution without
stage 1 involvement. Any r and β0 satisfying
1
1−β0 ≤ r ≤ X− u1−λ implements
the first best.
Proposition 1 above illustrates the central trade-off discussed in this pa-
per. Since the NGO maximizes the aggregate utility of the villagers, it may
have an incentive to channelize loan to the low-skilled villager. This is be-
cause the high-skilled villagers are “less needy”, in the sense that they have
a higher reservation utility, i.e. u > 0. The incentive for such socially
sub-optimal selection is higher in case the NGO is also involved in project
implementation since in that case the NGO can utilize its own expertise to
increase the productivity of the low skilled villager. Due to this, if the NGO
is allowed to get involved in stage 1, implementing the first best requires a
very low interest factor. In that case the objectives of the government and
the NGO get aligned, so that the loan goes to the high skilled villager. At
such a low rate of interest, however, equation (3) implies that it is impos-
sible to meet the feasibility condition for the bank. This follows since from
A1, X is relatively small. Hence under the appropriate parameter values the
optimal project design is to not involve the NGO in the second stage, even
though doing so is ex post efficient.
Note that this result has some implications for Hypothesis 2 in Besley
and Ghatak (1999). It states that “NGO provision will be more prevalent
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in projects where the NGO cares more about the beneficiaries.” Proposition
1 in this paper, however, suggests that the argument for restricting NGO
participation may get stronger, as the NGOs become more motivated. Of
course, in contrast to Besley and Ghatak (1999), we are concerned with the
provision of credit, rather than a public good, and in implementing the first
best.
We then briefly discuss the role of Assumption 1. Suppose X is large in
the sense that X > 1 + u
1−λ′ so that from (1) and (2) it follows that the first
best still requires sanctioning the loan to the high skilled villager. Hence, one
can always find r and βI in order to satisfy both (3) and (4) so that the first
best can always be implemented irrespective of institutional design. This
is because with a very high X, the government can always find an interest
factor which is low enough to correct the incentives of the NGO, but high
enough to ensure that the bank sanctions the loan. On the other hand, if X
is sufficiently low in the sense that X < u
1−λ′ , then from (1) and (2) it follows
that the first best involves giving the loan to the low-skilled villager, so that
the trade-off between social welfare and aggregate villager utility, which is
the focus of this paper, goes away.9 Finally, if u
1−λ′ < X < 1 +
u
1+λ
, then no
mechanism can implement the first best (since satisfying either eqns. (3) or
(4) will imply that the bank’s feasibility condition will be violated).
Our analysis therefore suggests that full involvement of NGOs is optimal
if the projects are either very productive or very unproductive, while there are
intermediate cases where it is socially optimal to keep the NGOs away from
project implementation. Under the assumption that project productivity is
linked to the average income level of the villagers, our analysis suggests that
9This is in line with Hypothesis 3 in Besley and Ghatak (1999) and some empirical
evidence reported in Farrington and Lewis (1993).
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there should be full involvement of NGOs in villages that are either relatively
rich, or relatively poor. Otherwise, NGO involvement should be restricted to
borrower selection alone.
Rather interestingly, the result goes through even if two different and
independent NGOs are involved in the two stages. Since the NGOs are only
interested in aggregate borrower welfare, borrower selection by the first NGO
is going to be biased as long as it knows that the inefficient borrowers are
going to helped out in the project implementation stage. Thus this problem
cannot be resolved by involving two different NGOs.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines public-private partnerships in micro-finance, whereby
NGOs are used for channelizing credit to the poor. We find that there may
be a distortion arising out of the fact that the NGO is a motivated agent, and
its interest may diverge from that of the social welfare maximizer. Further, it
turns out that controlling such distortion involves unbundling borrower selec-
tion and project implementation, with the NGO being involved in borrower
selection alone.
Our results have implications for two different, but related literatures. As
argued by Maskin and Tirole (2007), in the context of public-private part-
nerships, an important question is whether different stages, e.g. construction
and operation, should be bundled or not. Arguments against bundling are,
broadly speaking, two. First, an agent who is efficient in one of the stages,
need not be efficient in the other. In that case involving the same agent
in both stages is sub-optimal. Second, since the private agents are profit-
maximizers, their choice may involve selection of poor quality (which may
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be cost-efficient). In contrast, we consider a private agent who is motivated,
and it is this which creates the distortion in our framework. Interestingly,
Maskin and Tirole (2007) analyze a scenario where the government officials
may be socially motivated (among other things), and then investigate the
role of spending caps in controlling the resultant distortion.
Second, our analysis is of relevance to the micro-finance literature. In this
context, the argument against involving NGOs sometimes revolve around the
fact that they may be self-serving. Our analysis demonstrates that such self-
serving behavior (if it exists), is not the only possible source of distortion.
Our framework identifies a possible problem that may arise out of the fact
that NGOs may be motivated.10 From a policy perspective our analysis
suggests keeping NGOs out of project implementation activities in villages
that are neither too poor, nor too rich, and involving them fully otherwise.
10In the context of the Indian SHG-linkage program, Basu and Srivastava (2005) also
argue that the fact that NGOs may value social objectives over commercial ones, may be
problematic.
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